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From this it follows that all other apparent propositions are pseudo-propositions of various types and that all other uses of 'true' and 'truth' deviate markedly from the truth-by-correspondence (or agreement) that contingent propositions have in relation to reality.
Unlike genuine propositions, tautologies and contradictions "have no 'subject-matter'" (6.124), "lack sense," and "say nothing" about the world (4.461), and, analogously, mathematical equations are "pseudo-propositions" (6.2) which, when 'true' ('correct'; 'richtig' (6.2321)), "merely mark[
Analogously, mathematical pseudo-propositions are equations, which indicate or show that two expressions are equivalent in meaning and therefore are intersubstitutable.
If we wish to demarcate between "mathematical propositions" versus "mathematical pseudo-propositions," as we do, then the only way to ensure that there is no such thing as a meaningful, but undecidable (e.g.
nf(n)] that is customarily construed as the conclusion of the proof (PG 406, 374; PR �164), rather this pseudo-proposition or 'statement' stands 'proxy' for the "infinite possibility" (i.e.
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